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Abstract.
The justification of the public debt as a financial mechanism of the
descentralizated levels of government can be found in the fiscal federalism theory. As it
states, the subcentral governments have the mission of providing public goods, while the
central level of government has to assume the redistributive policy and the estabilization
policy. Then, the correct use of the public debt by the Autonomous Communities would
be to solve the intergenerational equity problems in the public goods financing when the
benefits of a public investment project will be materialised in the future. This framework
of the fiscal federalism theory is contained quite accurately in the Spanish legislation.
To the restrictions in the use of the public debt as a financial mechanism we
should add other curbs. One of them came from the necessity of our country of reaching
the criteria convergence in order to take part into the UE Monetary and Economic
Union,  and nowadays, as the euro has been introduced, , limits are being imposed by the
stability plan. As we know, the achievement of the nominal convergence between the
states which are going to adopt the Monetary Union, has required an important reduction
in the public deficit and a limitation in the total debt of the public Administration. In this
sense, although it has not been placed under 60% of the GPD, advances have been made.
In this paper we will focus on the study of the incidence of two factors: the
LOFCA regulation and the limits introduced by the EC on the public debt of the Spsnish
Autonomous Communities.2
1.  The introduction of the European Single Currency and its effects on the
finances of EC countries.
The European Council held in Hannover, 1998 entrusted a commission of experts
presided by Delors to prepare a report proposing the specific stages of the European
Monetary and Economic Union (EMU). This report was published in April 1989 entitled
“Report for the Monetary and Economic Union in the European Community” and
based on this, a three-stage process has been articulated:
n First phase. Developed between 1/7/1990 and 31/12/1993. Its basic objectives
consisted in making advances in constructing the domestic market and in achieving
the economic convergence of the EU member states which, to achieve this aim, made
a commitment to design long-term convergence programmes.
n Second phase. Developed between 1/1/1994 and 31/12/1998. The objectives set for
this second phase, in addition to being the continuation of those implemented in the
previous stage are the creation of the European Monetary Institute, the origin of the
future European Central Bank that will be in charge of managing the EU monetary
policy following the implantation of the euro, and the independence of the Central
Banks from their governments (compiled in our country in the Law of Autonomy of
the Bank of Spain which came into force on June 2
nd, 1994).  This means, among
other things, the end of privileged financing for the public sector and the prohibition
of monetization of the public deficit, that is to say, of the recourse of governments to
the credit of their central banks to finance their deficits.
Undoubtedly, the culminating moment of this stage was the European Council held on
May 3
rd, 1998 in which the countries which will accede to the third stage of the EMU
were selected, the bilateral exchange rates were announced and the creation of the
European Central Bank was made official.
n Third phase. Began on 1/1/1999 and will signify the culmination of the EMU process
with the implantation of the euro and the establishing of a common monetary policy
headed by the European System of Central Banks.
The implantation of the single currency in this third phase will be carried out in three
stages
1
n First stage, will cover up to 31/12/2001 at the latest and in this stage the national
currencies will continue to be used to make and receive payments although financial
and commercial operations can be referred in euros.
n Second stage. Between 1/1/2002 and 30/6/2002 at the latest there will be a period of
coexistence between national currencies and the euro.
n Third stage, from 1/7/2002 the euro will become the legal tender for the countries
forming part of the EMU.
Fulfilling these objectives obliges the countries making up the EMU to adopt a common
monetary policy but, contrary to theoretical models, has not led to the implementation of
                                                       
1 These stages as well as the chronoligy for attaining the EMU are described in the work España, plan de
transición al Euro published by the Minister of Economy and Public Finance, 1998.3
a centralised fiscal policy
2 but rather this continues to be entrusted to the national
authorities. Nevertheless, the budgetary policies should have a high degree of co-
ordination which has been imposed first by the convergence criteria required in order to
form part of the EMU and, once convergence has been achieved, by the so-called pact of
stability and growth.
For the selection of the eleven European countries which will form part of the euro




consideration was made to the fulfilling of a series of indicators of nominal economic
convergence as follows:
n Stability of prices, the average rate of inflation during the year prior to the review,
measured by the consumer price index on a comparative base cannot exceed by more
than 1.5% the average of that of the three member states with better price stability.
n Participation in the European exchange rate mechanism. During the two years prior to
the review the currency will be between the normal fluctuation margins established by
the European System of Exchange Rates without suffering any depreciation.
n Interest rates. During the year prior to the review the average nominal long-term
interest rate will not exceed by more than 2% that of the average of the three
countries with greater price stability.
n Sustainable public finance. The deficit of the public budget cannot exceed 3% of the
GDP and the public debt will not exceed 60% of the GDP. These have been the
criteria which have been evaluated with most flexibility, enabling the countries to
exceed these figures should substantial progress have occurred in the last few years
which bring the value of these magnitudes near to the reference limits. In fact, in the
Meeting of the Ecofin Council held on May 1
st 1998,the valid decisions on excessive
public deficits which currently only apply to Greece had to be abolished and the
criterion referring to the public debt will be applied exercising great flexibility.

















Austria 1.1 5.6 2.5 66.1 Yes Yes
Belgium 1.4 5.7 2.1 122.2 Yes Yes
Finland 1.3 5.9 0.9 55.8 Yes Yes
France 1.2 5.5 3.0 58.0 Yes Yes
Germany 1.4 5.6 2.7 61.2 Yes Yes
Ireland 1.2 6.2 +0.9 66.3 Yes Yes
Italy 1.8 6.7 2.7 121.6 Yes Yes
Luxembourg 1.4 5.6 +1.7 6.7 Yes Yes
                                                       
2 This fact is highlighted in the work by Vicente Fernández Rodríguez. Información Comercial
Española, nº 767, 1998, pp. 35-50.
3 An excellent summery of this Council has been made the Cabinet of The Second Vice-President of The
Government and The Minister of Economy and Public Finance and is published entitled “Reuniones
especiales del Consejo de la Unión Europea, 1-3 de mayo de 1998” in the nº 2.571 del Boletín
Económico del ICE, pp. 3-7.4
Spain 1.8 6.3 2.6 68.8 Yes Yes
Low Countries 1.8 5.5 1.4 72.1 Yes Yes
Portugal 1.8 6.2 2.5 62.0 Yes Yes
Denmark 1.9 6.2 +0.7 65.1 Yes Yes*
United
Kingdom 1.8 7.0 1.9 53.4 No No
Sweden 1.9 6.5 0.8 76.6 No No
Greece 5.2 9.8 4.0 108.7 No No
• Denmark, despite fulfilling the criteria for convergence has excluded itself from the
third phase of the EMU.
Source: Cabinet of the second Vice-president of the Government: “Special Meetings of
the European Union Council, May 1
st .3
rd”. Economic Bulletin of the Ice, No 2571, pp5.
Once the third phase of the EMU has been achieved, the rules of the fiscal policy are
projected towards the future by means of the pact of stability
4, adopted in the meeting of
Ecofin held in Dublin in December, 1997. This pact prohibits annual deficits in the
consolidated budget of the Public Administrations over 3% of the GDP unless in
exceptional circumstances or should there be a severe fall in the Gross Domestic Product
of the country (which should be situated at over 2%). Regarding the public debt, the
objective of lowering this to around 60% of the GDP is maintained.
With the data available from 1991 we can point out that most of the EMU countries have
adopted a path of budgetary discipline which has enabled them to substantially lower the
public deficits, despite the fact that the figures of public debt have not only not been
lowered but rather have considerably increased in the same period. Professor Fuentes
Quintana
5 (5) in his analysis of the Spanish situation, has pointed out how this reduction
of the public deficit can only have been achieved by means of a policy of consolidation of
the public expenditure and not by increases in taxation. Nevertheless, and despite the fact
that the data of the evolution of average tax burden  in the 15 countries of the European
Union reveal that in the period 1983-1995 this has only increased by 2% of the GDP, it
seems difficult that the proposed contention of the public deficit will be achieved in most
of the countries by means of the contention of public expenditure, without this being
accompanied by increases in the tax burden
6.
The Plan of Convergence designed by the Spanish Government  in 1994
7 in which the
1992 Programme of Convergence was brought up to date, in view of the fact that the
economic crisis which broke out in 1993 impeded its fulfilment, recognised the fact that
the deficit could only be reduced by cuts in public expenditure: “The individual tax
                                                       
4 The basic aspects of the stability pact are commented on in the work by Jesús Ferreiro Aparicio: “El
pacto de estabilidad: implicaciones para la construcción de la UEM”. Boletín Económico del ICE, nº
2.535, 1997, pp. 21-31.
5 Enrique Fuentes Quintana: “España y su ingreso en la Unión Monetaria Europea: algunas
consideraciones sobre el examen de convergencia de 1998”. Perspectivas del Sistema Financiero, nº 61,
1998, pp. 5-27.
6 Ken Messere: “OECD Tax developments in the 199s”. Bulletin of Intenational Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation”, July 1997, pp. 298-314.
7 Ministry of Economy and Public Finance: Updating of Convergence Programma. July 1994.5
burden which arises from the current Spanish tax system does not advise seeking higher
incomes during the period covered by the scenario by means of the regulated increase of
incomes. In the absence of increases in the individual tax burden, the increase in the fiscal
burden in terms of the GDP will depend, basically, on the success of the struggle against
fraud and the overall progressivity of the tax system (….)  The fact that the reduction of
the public deficit in the next few years has to fall, fundamentally, on discretionary actions
regarding the growth rate of public expenditure conditions the rate foreseen for the
reduction of the deficit”
8. This reduction of  public expenditure does not mean, as the
Programme points out, its complete reduction, but rather a decrease in its growth in
relation to the growth of the GDP of each year. The budget scenarios contemplated in
the Programme are compiled in Figure 2.
Figure 2.
Deficit and active debt, period 1994-1997.
Previsions of the 1994  Convergence Programme.
(In percentage of GDP).
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Public Admin. Deficit 7.3 6.7 5.9 4.4 3.0
I.-Central Public Adm. 6.1 5.7 5.1 3.8 2.7
- State 5.8 5.0 4.6 3.5 2.5
-S.S. y  AA.OO. 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2
II.-Public Adm.Territ. 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.3
Net Debt 55.8 60.7 63.9 65.5 65.2
Gross Debt 57.8 62.7 65.9 67.5 67.2
Source: Ministry of Finance, 1994.
Nevertheless, in 1995 a notable increase of the deficit compared to  the forecasts was
recorded and the fit in 1996 and 1997 had to be greater than foreseen, just as we can see
in figure 3. Regarding the public debt, this has not been lowered as much as foreseen.
Figure 3.
Deficit and active debt, period 1991-1997.
(In percentageof GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Deficit 4.9 3.6 6.8 6.3 6.6 4.4 2.6
Debt 45.8 48.4 60.5 63.1 65.7 70.1 68.8
Source: Joan Elías : El desafío de la moneda única Europea. La Caixa, Colección
Estudios e Informes, Nº 7, 1997, pp. 79 y 80 for years 1991-1996. For year 1997 : Bank
of Spain: Informe sobre la Convergencia, marzo de 1998.
The new Programme of Convergence for the period 1997-2000 which aims to meet the
requirements of budgetary discipline required by the pact of stability foresees a
continuous reduction of the deficit as well as of the public debt, in such a way that in the
                                                       
8 Ministry of Economy and Public Finance: Updating of Convergence Programma. July 1994, p. 30.6
year 2000 these are situated around 1.6% and 65.3% of the GDP, respectively. The
bases for obtaining these forecasts are the following:
a)  Moderate evolution of government consumption which must have a lower importance
in the GDP:
b)  Maintenance of social security payments
c)  Streamlining of the public company reducing the importance of government aid.
d)  Increase in public investment
e)  Reduction of the tax burden.
f)  Contention of the public expenditure of the set of territorial administrations, each one
making a commitment to achieving its deficit objectives.
In summary, the evolution of our public finance as a result of the convergnece objectives
required by the EMU is going to be marked by a line of discipline and austerity. In this
sense, the Bank of Spain unequivocally states
9:
“Definitively, the current cycle of recovery that the Spanish economy is undergoing
provides a favourable framework for the continuity of the consolidation process of public
finance, in such a way that, if the line of austerity and budgetary discipline is maintained,
quick improvements in the deficit and debt ratios can be attained in the following years.
These improvements are absolutely necessary, since, in the framework of the EMU, the
public finance of the member countries will be subject to fulfilling the pact of stability and
growth, which entails not only the maintenance of the standards defined by the
convergence criteria of Maastricht in fiscal matter, but also the rapid approach to a
situation of budgetary equilibrium”.
2.  The Budgetary consolidation and its effects on the debt of the Autonomous
Communities.
The classic theory of fiscal decentralisation is based on Musgrave´s functional theory
(1959).This functional theory considers three types of task to be achieved by the public
sector: a stabilising function which attempts to bring the economy close to its level of full
employment with a low inflation, a redistributive function of national income and wealth
and an allocative function focused on production and the efficient allocation of public
goods
10. Of these three functions the stabilising and redistributive ones should be
entrusted to the central level of the public finance and the allocative function justifies the
existence of the subcentral levels of government as they are entrusted the production of
local public goods.
With this distribution of functions between the different levels of government the crisis of
the Keynes theory and the doubts existing about the suitability of the recourse to public
debt to stimulate the aggregate demand affect the central level of government which has
been entrusted the task of achieving macro-economic stability more than the territorial
                                                       
9 Bank of Spain: Report on Convergence, March, 1998, p. 15.
10 The different functions of the Public Administrations and their assignation between different
government levels are described, among others, in the book by Javier Salinas Economía política del
Federalismo Fiscal Español. Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1991, 37 and the following pages.7
public finances
11. In effect, the Autonomous Communities should only recur to debt to
solve a problem of intergenerational equity in the production of goods and services.
Musgrave makes this explicit: “The budget of the services should not always be balanced
in the sense that expenditure is levelled by income from taxes. This will be the case if
meeting public needs has the nature of current consumption but not for capital
expenditure. In the case of capital expenditure the release of private capital and its
transfer to meet of public needs can be performed adequately by means of a debt-
purchase mechanism , rather than by a tax-purchase mechanism
12. Monasterio and
Pandiello have clarified this justification of the recourse to debt: “When part of the
benefits of a project are going to materialise in the future, the equitable financing of this
requires future beneficiaries to support part of the cost of the work. This can be achieved
by financing the project by the issue of debt in such a way that costs and benefits
coincide in time”
13.
Therefore, in the conception of the classic theory of fiscal federalism, the use of debt by
the subcentral  levels of government is limited to the financing of investment projects
whose benefits are going to be extended over time.
This theoretical framework has been faithfully compiled in our legislation. Hence, the
constitutional law of financing of the Autonomous Communities (LOFCA) has regulated
the recourse to credit of the Autonomous Communities in its Article 14. This legal
framework compiles the distinction between public debt which is applied to the issue of
public debt and the contraction of credit, loans arrranged with a private individual or
financial entity.  At the same time, a distinction is made between short-term debt, due to
treasury needs, and medium- and long- term debt for financing investments and between
external and internal debt
14
The requirements which public debt must meet are as follows
15:Firstly, as already
mentioned, that it should be used to cover investment costs.
n Secondly, when indebtedness materialises by the issueof debt or the arranging of
credit operations in foreign currency, the authorisation of the State will be necessary
to carry out the operation.
n The overall indebtedness of each Autonomous Community, to preserve its financial
equilibrium, is limited in such a way that the service charge of the debt, that is to say,
the annual expenditure for the amortization of the debt plus the payment of the
corresponding interest, cannot exceed 25% of the current income of the Community.
n Finally, there is a general limitation caused by the determinants of the economic policy
of stabilisation which obliges the credit operations of the Autonomous Communities
to be co-ordinated with one another and with the State economic policy within the
Council of Fiscal and Financial policy.
                                                       
11 See Javier Suárez Pandiello: “Las Comunidades Autónomas y su endeudamiento. Un test sobre sus
causas”. In Enrique Moldes and Pedro Puy (editors): La financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas.
Minerva Ediciones, 1996, pp. 186.
12 Richard Musgrave: The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill, 1959, Spanish edition by de
Editorial Aguilar, 1967.
13 Carlos Monasterio and Javier suárez Pandiello: Financiación Autonómica y Corresponsabilidad Fiscal
en España. Fundación BBV, 1993, p. 80.
14 See Antonio Aparicio and Carlos Monasterio: La Hacienda de la Comunidad Autónoma del
Principado de Asturias. Editorial Tecnos, 1993, pp. 97.
15 Compiled in Carlos Monasterio and Javier Suárez Pandiello: “El endeudamiento autonómico. Teoría y
evidencia empírica”, Fundamción BBV, colección Documenta, 1993, pp. 7.8
Despite these limitations, the fact is that the debt of the Autonomous Communities which
had undergone a moderate growth in the so-called transition period and until 1988, when
most of the transfers of competence of expenditure were completed, experienced from
this date onwards an accelerated growth, more marked until 1992 when, within the
financing agreements for the period 1992-96 the first frameworks of budgetary
consolidation were set, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4
Evolution of the Autonomous Community debt 1986-1996
(thousands of millions pesetas ).











































































































































































Total 508 725 1,053 1,624 2,322 3,029 3,804 4,340 5,128
Source: Bank of Spain, Boletín Estadístico, various years.
As we can observe from these data, the growth of debt has been explosive, a fact that
experts have attempted to attribute mainly to failures in the calculation of  the effective
cost of the transfers received by the Autonomous Communities and because of the
tendency of the autonomous governments to increase  expenditure without asking their
citizens to make sacrifices via increases in their tax burden. In this sense, it is sufficient to
recall that differentiated fiscal policies do not exist between the different Communities,
that the Communities have not exploited the possibility of establishing surcharges on
state taxes and that the revenue of their own taxes established by the different
autonomies is highly limited.
We should point out that, in our opinion, the system designed has two basic defects.
Firstly, as has already been mentioned, the limit of the financial burden is related to the
volume of current revenue of each Community. This brings it about that as these
communities receive more competences, their current revenues also increase and they
can make new increments in the level of their debt.9
Secondly, the LOFCA has not established any  sanction system of sanctions for the
Autonomous Communities that do not respect the established limits of debt. This has
meant that many Autonomous Communities have not fulfilled the requirements, just as
we shall go on to see. This situation is particularly worrying at the present time as if they
have not respected these limits to debt it is fitting to suppose with the more reason that
they will not respect the commitments of budgetary consolidation to adapt the overall
deficit of the Public Administrations to the requirements of the Monetary Union.
In effect, in the work of Monasterio and Pandiello (1993)
16, analysing the 1986 to 1990
period, it  is affirmed that only three Autonomous Communities (Asturias, Cantabria and
Galicia) have respected the limit of the destination of debt, the other communities having
employed the long-term debt to finance current expenditure. The limit of the financial
burden with respect to current resources has been exceeded in the 1986-1900 period  by
Cantabria and Murcia.
Because of all of these non-fulfilments it became essential, from 1992 onwards, to define
a framework of budgetary consolidation enabling the convergence objectives of Article
104.c of the European Union Treaty to be met. Taking into account that the
Autonomous Communities have become great producers of public debt we should not be
surprised that in the Agreement of the Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy held on
January 20, 1992 the need to proceed to an adequate budgetary co-ordination between
the different levels of government was emphasised:
“The need for a greater fiscal convergence in the scope of the EEC is a requirement for
Spain´s entry into the group of countries participating in the third phase of the process of
the Monetary and Economic Union. This budgetary convergence requires a progressive
reduction of the Need for Financing, in terms of GDP, of the Public Administrations,
which requires a co-ordinated action of the budgetary policy of the Central
Administration and of the Autonomous Communities”.
This need for co-ordination was materialised in the Programmes of Convergence, in that
of 1992 as well as in its updated version in 1994, as seen in Figure 2 which shows the
deficit objectives foreseen in the 1994 programme. The scenarios for debt of the
Autonomous Communities were set in 1992 and revised in 1995. The following figures
compare the real debt of each Autonomous Community at the end of each financial year
with the debt contemplated in each of the two consolidation scenarios for the period
1992-1996, the last year for which we have liquidated financial years.
                                                       
16 Work cited, pp. 10.10
Figure 5,
Degree of fulfilment of budgetary consolidation scenarios,
1,992-1,994 (data in millions of pesetas )
1992 1993 1994
Real D. Scen., 1992 Real D. Scen. 1992 Scen. 1995 Real D. Scen. 1992 Scen. 1995
País Vasco 151,000 152,648 185,900 200,975.8 198,320.2 239,000 241,409.3 252,318
Cataluña 
17 405,000 326,549.6 533,400 384,499.7 519,995 730,500 430,026.1 625,335
Galicia 182,000 186,649.9 234,100 244,217.1 247,155 288,100 281,640.6 299,636
Andalucía 427,000 495,374.4 534,200 618,103.5 617,163 622,500 711,127.1 718,398
Asturias 46,000 57,499.4 44,800 68,060.5 62,544 57,200 75,673.4 67,990
Cantabria 43,000 57,127.4 43,300 67,231.3 48,828.7 39,400 75,219.2 44,451
Rioja 17,000 25,937.7 18,700 29,401.4 20,825 18,900 31,578.7 20,825
Murcia 72,000 65,770.4 81,600 73,579.4 76,386 87,900 78,100.7 82,450.6
Valencia 233,000 188,033.1 304,200 232,901.7 263,824 404,500 261,958.2 302,131.2
Aragón 44,000 54,225.6 72,300 74,617.4 77,912.3 97,000 85,662.1 111,440.3
C,- Mancha 38,000 39,560.4 47,400 53,862.2 54,665 69,200 64,304.7 65,934
C, León 56,000 57,101.5 73,000 77,467.4 80,664 97,000 95,066.6 97,262.2
Canarias 60,000 80,779.1 91,700 103,544.8 102,115.6 109,800 117,713.8 129,843.6
Navarra 41,000 38,790.6 76,300 78,807.8 76,591 84,000 101,095.7 110,123
Extremadura 40,000 42,726.4 56,000 56,566.6 68,029 63,000 67,676.8 80,494
Baleares 32,000 29,536.8 40,000 37,421.1 34,128 43,000 42,525.1 38,839
Madrid 231,000 239,648.4 260,000 278,587.9 273,958.3 281,000 306,220.3 317,736
Source: Bank of  Spain and Counciel of Fiscal and Financial
                                                       
17 The debt scenario of Cataluña has already been reviewed in 1993 to be later reviewed in 1995 alike the rest of the Autonomous Communities.11
Figure 6,
Degree of fulfilment of budgetary consolidation scenario of 1995
1995-1996 and objetive debt form 1997
(data in millions of pesetas )
1995 1996 1997
Real Debt Objective Debt Real Debt Objective Debt Objective Debt
País Vasco 293,000 296,379 327,000 332,623 359,653
Cataluña 965,000 708,271 1,176,000 759,451 790,875
Galicia 331,000 342,508 372,000 372,608 400,108
Andalucía 690,000 810,539 845,000 876,062 910,464
Asturias 66,000 75,676 67,000 81,446.9 84,946.9
Cantabria 35,000 38,377.8 24,000 31,883.2 31,048.8
Rioja 22,000 22,315 20,000 22,903 22,903
Murcia 89,000 87,046.4 91,000 90,166.4 91,928.2
Valencia 417,000 332,941.6 502,000 355,272.3 367,799.9
Aragón 109,000 129,440.3 122,000 142,440.3 148,940.3
C,- Mancha 75,000 74,884 83,000 79,987 83,487
C, León 132,000 111,662 141,000 120,594 125,421
Canarias 114,000 139,829.6 167,000 148,079.6 153,079.6
Navarra 131,000 134,660 129,000 162,774 162,452
Extremadura 73,000 89,070.3 83,000 93,353.3 95,853.3
Baleares 46,000 44,107.4 44,000 49,224.3 52,124.3
Madrid 421,000 348,645.6 459,000 368,331.6 379,053.9
Source: Bank of  Spain and Counciel of Fiscal and Financial12
The following conclusions can be drawn from the data :
Firstly, and for us the most worrying of all, the review of the scenarios for debt of 1995,
in agreement with the data, was made in virtue of the past debt, in such a way that the
Autonomous Communities with greater accumulated debt and that least fulfilled the
1992 scenarios were those to which a greater capacity for growth of future debt was
allocated. On the contrary, Communities such as Aragón which easily fulfilled the
objectives set for 1992 saw how their debt limits were lowered in the 1995 review.
This situation of increase in the debt limits in terms of the existing debt poses serious
doubts as to the efficiency of the scenarios as an instrument for limiting the deficit and
debt in the Autonomous Communities. This is all the more so when,  as we have already
mentioned, there does not exist any sanction system for the Communities which do not
fulfil the limits and in addition these Communities are used to not meeting the LOFCA
requisites without sanctions.
In order to correct these problems, it might be fitting to consider some type of economic
sanction- for example a decrease in State transfers- for those Communities that do not
meet the stipulated objectives, just as there exists a sanction systems imposed by the
European Union for those countries exceeding the deficit objectives compiled in the pact
of stability and growth passed in Dublin in 1996. It must be recognised that, any way,
these sanctions are easier to apply should the public debt objectives not be fulfilled than if
the public debt objectives are not fulfilled, as in the second case the Central
Administration is the first to not respect them. In fact, as shown in figure 1 of this work,
only Finland, France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have met the requisite that
their public debt besituated below 60% of the GDP, which forced this convergence
criterion to be relaxed.
Secondly, we must point out that, compared to the Communities that have systematically
fulfilled the assigned debt objectives (this is the case of País Vasco, Galicia, Andalucía,
Cantabria, La Rioja, Aragón and Extremadura) and others which have complied with
them in some financial years, there exist some Communities which have never fulfilled
them. This is the case of Murcia, Valencia, Madrid except in the financial year of 1992
and in particular Cataluña where debt is rising at an alarming rate and in 1996 amounted
to approximately a quarter of the total foreseen for all the Autonomous Communities in
the consolidation scenario.
Thirdly, and this data seems to us to be particularly worrying, in the recent financial years
the number of Communities not complying with the foreseen scenarios has increased.
This occurs with Castilla León from 1995, Castilla la Mancha from 1994, Canarias from
96 with a very strong increase in debt in that year. Only in the case of Baleares has the
opposite contrary tendency been recorded, the debt decreasing in that year (1996).
The fact that the number of Communities exceeding the debt has increased endangers the
fulfilling of future objectives and makes us fear that this responds to the fact that some
autonomous governments are beginning to consider that it is the Communities.. most in13
debt which receive better treatment and there are no incentives to follow the path of
contention of the arranged debt.
The current bilateral negotiation for the debt scenarios between the State and each of the
Autonomous Communities, before being submitted to the Council of Fiscal and Financial
Policy, makes us ask ourselves whether a struggle will occur between communities to
obtain a higher portion of debt from a previously set total. In this case, we fear that the
objectives of lowering the deficit and the debt accumulated will never be fulfilled as this,
in our opinion, requires equipping the system with a stable financing framework, with
greater fiscal co-responsibility and a commitment by the different governmental levels to
fulfil the important objectives that our country has set itself upon forming part of the
European Monetary Union.
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